

point theory, the analysis of the bargaining problem, the games on graphs, the studies on matching and on kidney exchange.

You may find other notes at the following addresses:

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2012/advanced-economicsciences2012.pdf
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2012/popular-economicsciences2012.pdf

The first document is more academic oriented, while the second one resumes in few pages the common aspects of the research of the two authors.

At this point it seems very difficult to add something more, so I just want to tell you two personal experiences with the works these two great researchers.

Very often I was looking for a fair allocation of the worth of a cooperative game and even starting from completely different hypotheses, I ended with the Shapley value, witnessing once more the relevant properties of fairness of this solution.

The work of Alvin Roth was very useful in my studies on two-sided markets and on models for providing incentives to research on rare diseases.

Theses of Campione d'Italia

In 2005 the participants of the International Workshop on Mathematics and Democracy held in Erice agreed on a common set of principles that a fair electoral system should satisfy, known by the scholars as Erice Decalogue (available at <http://www.math.uni-augsburg.de/stochastik/bazi/EriceDecalogue-en.pdf>).

The School in Campione. From 9 to 15 September 2012, the Summer School on Game Theory and Models of Voting took place in Campione d'Italia (CO). The speakers, experts from Mathematics, Economics, Political Sciences and Laws, want to confirm and integrate the Erice Decalogue with the following:

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- (i) The results from Theory of Complex Systems, Game Theory and Political Sciences show that no electoral system satisfies all reasonable criteria of performance.

- (ii) The system should encourage parties to present programs or electoral manifestos that are distinguishable for the voters.
- (iii) The influence of the parties over legislation ought to reflect their electoral support.
- (iv) The voting system should be transparent and understandable to the voters.
- (v) The system should encourage the voters to vote.
- (vi) The system should be difficult to manipulate.

The meaning of (i) is that the choice has to be made among imperfect systems, emphasizing the features that in a particular situation are more relevant, e.g. representativeness, non-exclusion of minority groups, or others. (ii) already appears in the Italian rules. According to (iii) the Parliament and the electoral body should

make the same choice, at least about the most important issues. (iv) suggests to avoid rules that even if are reasonable may result too complex for a significant part of the voters. Relatively to points (v) and (vi), it is possible to refer to a referendum for abrogating a law, when the groups that want to maintain the law sometimes invite their supporters to abstention, aiming at making the referendum not valid, because the quorum was not reached.

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Giulio Casati
(University of Insubria)

Vito Fragnelli
(University of Eastern Piedmont)

Gianfranco Gambarelli
(University of Bergamo)

Manfred Holler
(University of Hamburg)

Roberto Lucchetti
(Polytechnic of Milano)

Claudio Martinelli
(University of Milano-Bicocca)

Jacek Mercik
(Wroclaw University of Technology)

Hannu Nurmi
(University of Turku)

Guido Ortona
(University of Eastern Piedmont)

Fioravante Patrone
(University of Genova)