
Workshop: Voting, Power, and Manipulation

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The two-day international workshop on Voting, Power, and Manipulation has been hosted by the Institute of Economic Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, but in the end was a joint effort of the Institute of Socioeconomics of Hamburg University and the Public Choice Research Center of the University of Turku. Its key aim was to advance research and provide a venue to foster joint cooperation on the topics of voting and power for both Ph.D. candidates and senior staff. The workshop was co-sponsored by the Czech Grant Foundation (GAČR) within the project “Political economy of voting behavior, theory of rational voter and models of strategic voting” (402/09/1066) and by the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague within its institutional research framework (MSMT0021620841).

Participants came from universities and research centers from Germany (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Hamburg University), Finland (University of Turku), Poland (Wrocław University of Technology), Italy (University of Eastern Piedmont) and the Czech Republic (Charles University in Prague).

The portfolio of papers presented was very broad, ranging from empirical studies on EU decision processes, analysis of voters’ spillovers between candidates for the presidency of Poland and the efficiency of local governments in the Czech Republic, to purely theoretical pa-

pers about bargaining, signaling, manipulating, the power of veto players, TU-games, the relationship between manipulability and dictatorship, power indices enhancements, and the optimization of weighted voting games efficiency.

The workshop was officially opened by the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University in Prague, Professor Jan Ámos Víšek, who introduced Charles University and Faculty of Social Sciences to the participants and mentioned a few interesting historical facts about the ancient Charles University, which was founded in 1348. The workshop was divided into two days, with each day offering three 90-minute sessions.

The first day started with a session on manipulability in voting (F. Turnovec and J. Palguta, Charles University, Prague). It was followed by a session dealing with an apriori evaluation of the power of veto players applied on the division of influence between president and parliament (J. W. Mercik, Wrocław University of Technology), and with an analysis of the Polish presidential elections of 2010 employing ecological regression (M. Mazurkiewicz, Wrocław University of Technology). The last session of the first day was devoted to a very interesting area of transferable utility games and their balanced solutions (R. Levínský, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Germany) and to a practical paper employing two different approaches of power com-

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putation for environmental policy-making institutions and organizations, proposing to split the responsibility among players based on their power (W. Wegner, Hamburg University).

The second day opened with a session consisting of presentations from the field of signaling and its application to a specific conflict of a civic initiative proposer and a conservative mayor (M. Gregor, Charles University, Prague); a presentation about the generalization of coalitional bargaining taking into account the Markov property (A. Nohn, Hamburg University and University of Turku, Finland); and a presentation using advanced methods of efficiency computation to compare the efficiency of local governments in the Czech Republic (L. Št'astná, Charles University, Prague).

This was then followed by a session focused on the different kinds of power indices and their properties. The first presentation of this session was about the relatively new type of power indices – the so-called FP-family indices – and how to embed the classical indices into this family (V. Fragnelli, University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy). The next presentation was about the computational aspects of power indices, analyzing the computational times and memory usage differences among different workstations used for computation (A. Pajala, University of Turku, Finland). The last presentation

of this session was about the theoretical properties of the efficiency of simple weighted voting games focusing mainly on its optimization (P. Doležel, Charles University in Prague).

The last session was held by political scientists from Charles University: The first speaker in the session presented the decision-making shifts in the EU Council that are anticipated due to Lisbon Treaty implementation using cluster analysis (B. Plechanovová, Charles University in Prague). The next presentation examined the impact of the left-right political position of key actors on the length of a co-decision procedure in the EU legislative process (V. Knutelská, R. Hokovský, Charles University, Prague) and the last presentation provided theoretical insights into possible ‘inertia’ in the Council of EU’s decision-making process (M. Parížek, Charles University, Prague).

All presented papers can be found on the workshop website in the Research section of the <http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/>. The editors of this journal also plan to launch an AUCO special issue from this workshop, scheduled to be released during the second half of 2011. The special issue will address scholars from several areas of research, mainly economists, political scientists and game theorists. It seeks to provide a lasting contribution to power measurement, game theory, voting theory, public choice, and political economy.