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Total downloads:628200
Total abstract views:881009



Updated statistics (Vol. 2-5)


  • 54 accepted articles (40 international, 14 local)
  • 40 rejected articles (30 international, 10 local)
  • Acceptance rate is 57% (54/94); not significantly different for international articles (57%, 40/70) and local articles (58%, 14/24).
  • The ratio of international to local articles (for accepted articles) is 74:26 (40/54 vs. 14/54).

Notes: The list does not include articles that are currently under review. We consider a paper to be local if affiliation of any author is institution located in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, it is classified as an international article. In the statistics, we do not include the pilot year 2007 (Vol. 1).

Forthcoming in the next issue 6(2)


Negotiating the Lisbon Treaty: Redistribution, Efficiency and Power indices

D. Varela, J. Prado-Dominguez

Abstract: In this paper we try to explain the intergovernmental negotiation of the Lisbon treaty from a rational choice perspective with the aid of power index analysis. There are two aspects of the reform of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council that we find puzzling. The first one is that, according to Shapley-Shubik index based on the notion of power as the distribution of a fixed prize, small and medium-sized member states have lost power as compared to the Nice treaty, which conflicts with the unanimity requirement for treaty reform. The second one is that, according to the Banzhaf measure based on the notion of power as influence, the Lisbon treaty leaves all member states worse off in absolute terms as compared to the Convention’s draft. We propose the measure developed by Steunenberg et al. (1999) as a possible solution to these paradoxes, and draw some conclusions about the nature of EU policy making and power index analysis.

Keywords: Council, European Union, Lisbon treaty, negotiation, power index, voting
JEL classification: D78, F55, H77  

Role of Political Affiliation across the European Institutions in the Dynamics of the EU Legislative Process

R. Hokovsky, V. Knutelska

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of the impact of party political affiliation on the pace of the EU legislative process. It hypothesises that the codecision process should be faster if the key actors from the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council are closer on the left-right policy scale or share affiliation to the same political family. The hypotheses are tested on the data covering the period of five years, from May 2004 to June 2009. While closeness on the left-right policy scale did not prove to have any effect, the findings show that if all three main actors, or at least the EP rapporteur and responsible Commissioner, come from the same political family, the codecision-process is indeed faster. The paper thus aims to contribute to the study of importance of party political ties and left-right cleavages in the EU decision-making.

Keywords: European decision-making, co-decision, left-right cleavage, party political affiliation
JEL classification: D72, H1 

Analysis of Regional Aspects of Voting Behaviour: The Case of Polish Presidential Election

M. Mazurkiewicz

Abstract: Transition of votes is observed when a voter who voted for a given candidate in the first round of election, votes for another candidate in the runoff round of election. There are two types of transitions. Transition is obvious when preferred candidate is a loser in first round. In other case transition also may happen. Exact information about the scale of transitions is usually unavailable. There are many opinion pools, even exit pools, but exact transition’s data is not collected during election. Ecological regression techniques give an opportunity to obtain quantitative description of electoral behaviour from aggregated data. Aggregated data set is published after election. Ecological regression approach gives reliable results under homogeneity assumption. Homogeneity in this case is considered in term of electoral behaviour. Homogeneity assumption if applied for the whole country is usually not held. Regional decomposition of estimation process, used for the description of voters’ behaviour, extends application the ecological regression to large regions or even for the whole country. In this analysis maximum likelihood approach and regional decomposition of voting results is used. The last presidential election 2010 in Poland is used as an empirical example. Presidential election in Poland consists of two rounds if none wins more than 50% of the votes, there is runoff round. The interval between rounds of election in Poland is two weeks.

Keywords: Ecological regression, electorate flows, transition of votes, homogeneity of electorate, decomposition
JEL classification: C39

Augmented Solow Model with Mincerian Human Capital and Infrastructure Externalities

T. Brodzicki

Abstract: According to Crescezni and Rodriguez-Pose (2008) backward European states and regions should follow balanced strategies in which infrastructure development is coordinated with policies aimed at developing human capital and the innovative potential of regions. In order to assess their postulates we extend the analysis of Carstensen et al. (2009) further augmenting the neoclassical Solow Model to incorporate Mincerian schooling externalities and infrastructure externalities in a single theoretical framework. Infrastructure is introduced into the model in a manner similar to exogenous Hicks-neutral technological change – raising the overall efficiency of an economy. The theoretical model has been empirically tested for a panel of European economies in the period 1999-2010. Econometric estimates for a balanced panel data model bring interesting results. The overall fit of the model is considerable. In accordance with our expectations, the macroeconomic returns to human capital accumulation and infrastructure are positive and statistically significant for a full sample of countries. Externalities are stronger for CEE transition economies than for non-CEE countries. The infrastructure externality is positive and statistically significant for CEE states only when we control for the level of openness of an economy. Results obtained are robust when taken with the modifications of the baseline empirical model.

Keywords: Economic growth, human capital, transport infrastructure, augmented neoclassical growth model, Mincerian schooling
JEL classification: O41, H52, H54, C21, C23

Scopus and Web of Science citations


At the moment, Scopus and Web of Knowledge identify citations to the CER from the following journals:

  • Acta Physica Polonica B
  • AIP Advances
  • Baltic Journal of Economics
  • Central European Journal of Operations Research
  • Chaos
  • Comparative Economic Studies
  • Control and Cybernetics
  • Czech Journal of Economics and Finance
  • Economic Record
  • Economics Bulletin
  • Ekonomska Istrazivanja - Economic Research
  • Eurasian Geography and Economics
  • Economics of Transition
  • Games and Economic Behavior
  • Group Decision and Negotiation
  • Human Systems Management
  • International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making
  • International Journal of Intelligent Systems
  • International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowlege-Based Systems
  • Journal of Applied Mathematics and Decision Sciences
  • Journal of Mathematical Economics
  • Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
  • Mathematical and Computer Modelling
  • Mathematical Social Sciences
  • Metalurgia International
  • Omega
  • Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
  • PLoS ONE
  • Politicka Ekonomie
  • Prague Economic Papers
  • Social Choice and Welfare
  • Theory and Decision 

The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 1


A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:


Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games
L. Mallozzi, S. Tijs
The Czech Economic Review 6 (1), 5-13

Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme
G. E. Halkos, G. J. Papageorgiou
The Czech Economic Review 6 (1), 14-37

Endogenous Heterogeneity, the Propagation of Information and Macroeconomic Complexity
O. Gomes
The Czech Economic Review 6 (1), 38-58

Cartels in the Kautiliya Arthasastra
V. Kumar
The Czech Economic Review 6 (1), 59-79

Project Management for a Country with Multiple Objectives
W. K. M. Brauers
The Czech Economic Review 6 (1), 80-101

Total downloads and total abstract views on journal homepage for articles in Volume 5 (2011)



Hughes Hallet, A., Libich, J., Stehlík, P.,Welfare Improving Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Downloads: 362, Abstract views: 486.
Albulescu, C.T., Economic and Financial Integration of CEECs: The Impact of Financial Instability. Downloads: 312, Abstract views: 520.
Fidrmuc, J., Süss, P.J., The Outbreak of the Russian Banking Crisis. Downloads: 288, Abstract views: 534.
Yalcinkaya, Koyuncu, J., Foreign Bank Presence and Bank Spreads: Evidence from Turkey. Downloads: 330, Abstract views: 494.
Schofield, N., Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic? Downloads: 348, Abstract views: 563.


Danišková, K., Fidrmuc, J., Inflation Convergence and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve in the Czech Republic. Downloads: 286, Abstract views: 448.
Lisi, G., Pugno, M., Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy. Downloads: 210, Abstract views: 429.
Maslowska, A.A., Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation. Downloads: 176, Abstract views: 358.
Bertini, C., Gambarelli, G., Scarelli, A., Varga, Z., Equilibrium Solution in a Game between a Cooperative and its Members. Downloads: 145, Abstract views: 353.
Doležel, P., Estimating the Efficiency of Voting in Big Size Committees. Downloads: 158, Abstract views: 346.
Fragnelli, V., Marina, M.E., Skill and Chance in Insurance Policies. Downloads 189, Abstract views: 365.
Scalzo, V., Existence of Equilibrium Prices for Discontinuous Excess Demand Correspondences. Downloads: 185, Abstract views: 385.
Güth, W., Levati, M.V., Ploner, M., Let Me See You! A Video Experiment on the Social Dimension of Risk Preferences. Downloads: 131, Abstract views: 357.


Hosli, M.O., Uriot, M.C.J., Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement. Downloads: 113, Astract views: 255.
Plechanovová, B., Coalitions in the EU Council: Pitfalls of Multidimensional Analysis. Downloads: 107, Abstract views: 254.
Holler, M.J., Wegner, W., Power and Responsibility in Environmental Policy Making. Downloads: 89, Abstract views: 241.
Chessa, M., Fragnelli, V., Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family. Downloads: 68, Abstract views: 240.
Doležel, P., Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games. Downloads: 76, Abstract views: 314.
Palguta, J., Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation. Downloads: 85, Abstract views: 257.

Forthcoming in the next issue 6(1)


Stackelberg Assumption vs. Nash Assumption in Partially Cooperative Games

L. Mallozzi, S. Tijs

Abstract: We deal with n-person normal form game where a subset of players decide to cooperate (signatories) and choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the coalition members as in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) context. The non-cooperating (non-signatories) players choose their strategies as a Nash equilibrium. In this paper the partial cooperative equilibrium (PCE) under the Nash-Cournot and the Stackelberg assumptions are considered and presented also in the case of non-signatories multiple decision. Some properties are discussed in both situations, particularly the profit of the players are compared.

Keywords: Partial cooperation, Stackelberg assumption, Nash-Cournot assumption, Stackelberg leader’s value
JEL classification: C72, C79 

Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme

G. E. Halkos, G. J. Papageorgiou

Abstract: In this paper we investigate a dynamic setting of environmental taxation, for which the government imposes a tax rate in order to internalize externalities caused by polluting firms. The basic model consists of the intertemporal maximization problem for an additively separable utility which is subject to the pollution accumulation constraint. We analyze some various aspects of the same setting such as the leader-follower, the social planning and the simultaneous move game. The model is very simple and has some similarities with capital taxation models. The crucial variables of the model are the tax rate as a control and the pollution stock as a state. We discuss a scheme in which polluters adopt Markovian emission strategies with respect to the flows, and the tax rate imposed is, in the most cases, a constant depending on the discount rate. Moreover, computing the time paths for the control and state variables, the welfare index analysis, that follows, reveals substantial inefficiencies caused by the leader-follower setting, compared with the social planning optimal control setting.

Keywords: Pollution control, taxation, dynamic leader-follower games
JEL classification: C61, C62, D43, H21  

Endogenous Heterogeneity, the Propagation of Information and Macroeconomic Complexity

O. Gomes

Abstract: The economy is an adaptive and evolving complex system. The recognition of this fact has produced, over the last few years, a gradual but firm shift on the direction taken by mainstream economic thought. The representative agent paradigm is giving place to settings of interacting heterogeneous agents, capable of generating dynamic outcomes that are unique for each assumed pattern of interaction. The complexity era, as it is called, requires original insights and innovative approaches, in order to reinterpret the economic reality. This paper intends to contribute to the complexity literature in economics by exploring a popular macroeconomic model (the sticky-information model) from a new angle. Information acquisition by price-setting firms will be endogenously determined in two steps: (i) the competition between almost identical media leads to an irregular pattern of information creation; (ii) once created, information spreads throughout the interested audience following a diffusion process. The consequence is an erratic aggregate pattern of information acquisition that has consequences at a macro level, namely concerning the shape of the Phillips curve, which will change every period. Heterogeneity, self-organization, evolution and out-of-equilibrium dynamics are features that allow to classify the suggested framework as a setting of macroeconomic complexity.

Keywords: Complexity, information production and diffusion, heterogeneity, sticky-information, nonlinear dynamics
JEL classification: E30, E52, D83, D84 

Project Management for a Country with Multiple Objectives

W. K. M. Brauers

Abstract: This paper proposes project management for a national economy in search for new projects, even with competition between projects. Traditional Cost-Benefit does not respond to this purpose. Indeed Cost-Benefit is only interested in one specific project and not in a competition between projects. In addition all goals (objectives) have to be translated into money terms, leading sometimes to immoral consequences. On the contrary Multi-Objective Optimization takes care of different objectives, whereas the objectives keep their own units. However different methods exist for the application of Multi-Objective Optimization. The author tested them after their robustness resulting in seven necessary conditions for acceptance. Nevertheless these seven conditions concern only Discrete Optimization and not Continuous Optimization or Interactive Multi-Objective Methods. MOORA (Multi-Objective Optimization by Ratio analysis coupled with Reference Point Theory) and MULTIMOORA (MOORA plus the Full Multiplicative Form), assisted by Ameliorated Nominal Group and Delphi Techniques, satisfy the seven conditions, although in a theoretical way. A simulation exercise illustrates the use of these methods, ideals to be strived for as much as possible.

Keywords: Project management, cost-benefit, multi-objective optimization, robustness, ameliorated nominal group and Delphi techniques, full multiplicative form, MOORA, MULTIMOORA
JEL classification: C44, D81, E17, O22, P11 

Cartels in the Kautiliya Arthasastra

V. Kumar

Abstract:This paper examines the legal-economic dimension of collusive manipulation of prices from the perspective of the Kautiliya Arthasastra, an ancient Indian treatise on law and statecraft, which is among the oldest sources of information about cartels. It identifies cartels in the treatise, shows that cartels were treated more severely than individuals who manipulated prices, discusses the efficacy of penalties from the perspective of deterrence, and discusses the evolution of relevant laws. The economic analysis presented in the paper throws new light on the controversy surrounding the internal consistency of the Arthasastra. The paper also highlights the need to take note of the moral-legal environment within which pre-modern markets operated before studying them with the help of models developed for modern markets.

Keywords: Arthasastra, collusion, Dharmasastra, economic history, indology, just price, trade
JEL Classification: B11, K21, L41, L51, N45 

Citations retrieved from Harzing's Publish or Perish, 2007-2011


Aggregate statistics

Papers: 107
Citations: 122
Years: 6
Cites/paper: 1.14
h-index: 6 
g-index: 7

Number of citations, Authors, Title, Volume (Issue)

12, F Turnovec, New Measure of Voting Power, 1(1)
11, SZ Alparslan Gok, R Branzei…, Some characterizations of convex interval games, 2(3)
10, MO Hosli, Council decision rules and European Union constitutional design, 2(1)
8, F Turnovec, National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making, 2(2)
8, J Babecký, Aggregate wage flexibility in new EU member states, 2(2)
6, J Fidrmuc…, The outbreak of the Russian banking crisis, 5(1)
4, L Mallozzi, S Tijs, Partial Cooperation and Non-Signatories Multiple Decision, 2(1)
4, N Schofield, Is the Political Economy Stable or Chaotic?, 5(1)
4, R Branzei, G Ferrari, V Fragnelli…, A flow approach to bankruptcy problems, 2(2)
4, DY Kenett, Y Shapira, A Madi…, Dynamics of stock market correlations, 4(3)
3, M Luptáčik, W Koller, B Mahlberg…, Growth and Employment Potentials of Chosen Technology Fields, 2(1)
3, A Garnaev…, Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches, 2(1)
3, J Zápal, Judging the sustainability of Czech public finances, 1(1)
3, H Nurmi…, More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment, 2(2)
3, V Fragnelli…, Strategic manipulations and collusions in Knaster procedure, 3(2)
3, N Schofield…, Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining, 3(3) 3, N Švarcová…, The Financial Impact of Government Policies on Families with Children in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 3(1)
2 A Geršl, Political economy of public deficit: Perspectives for constitutional reform, 1(1)
2, S Shikano, Simulating party competition and vote decision under mixed member electoral systems, 3(3)
2, L. Mallozzi, S Tijs, Partial cooperation and multiple non-signatories decision, 2(1)
2, M Zeleny, On the essential multidimensionality of an economic problem: towards tradeoffs-free economics, 3(2)
2, L Cioni, Ranking electoral systems through hierarchical properties ranking, 3(3)
2, M Hrubý, Algorithmic Approaches to Game-theoretical Modeling and Simulation, 2(3)
1, J Kodera, K Sladký…, Neo-Keynesian and Neo-Classical Macroeconomic Models: Stability and Lyapunov Exponents, 1(3)
1, M Bauer, J Chytilová…, Effects of Education on Determinants of High Desired Fertility: Evidence from Ugandan Villages, 1(3)
1, L Krištoufek, Rescaled Range Analysis and Detrended Fluctuation Analysis: Finite Sample Properties and Confidence Intervals, 4(3)
1, J Baruník, L Vácha…, Tail Behavior of the Central European Stock Markets during the Financial Crisis, 4(3)
1, M Viren, Does the Value-Added Tax Shift to Consumption Prices?, 3(2)
1, L Šťastná, Spatial Interdependence of Local Public Expenditures: Selected Evidence from the Czech Republic, 3(1)
1, G Lisi…,Tax Morale, Entrepreneurship, and the Irregular Economy, 5(2)
1, P Jakubík, Credit Risk and the Finnish Economy, 1(3)
1, S Ottone, F Ponzano…, Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective, 3(3)
1, H Nurmi, Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?, 4(1)
1, G Bergantinos…, On some properties of cost allocation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems, 2(3)
1, A Derviz, Cross-Border Risk Transmission by a Multinational Bank, 1(1)
1, J Antal…, Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption, 1(3)
1, V Fragnelli, The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament, 3(3)
1, CT Albulescu, Economic and Financial Integration of CEECs: The Impact of Financial Instability, 5(1)
1, M Zeleny, Bata Management System: A built-in resilience against crisis at the micro level, 4(1)
1, L Urban, Koordinace hospodářské politiky zemí EU a její meze, 1(2)
1, J Hlaváček…, Poptávková funkce na trhu s pojištěním: porovnání maximalizace paretovské pravděpodobnosti přežití s teorií EUT von Neumanna a Morgensterna s..., 1(2)

Statistics for articles published in the last Vol. 5 (2011)


  • 21 accepted articles (16 international, 5 local),
  • 18 rejected articles (14 international, 4 local),
  • Acceptance rate is 53.8 % (21/39); not significantly different for international articles (53.3%, 16/30) and local articles (55.5%, 5/9).
  • The ratio of international to local articles (for accepted articles) is 16 to 5.
  • Google Scholar finds 12 citations of articles from this last volume.  

We consider a paper to be local if the main affiliation of any author is institution located in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, it is classified as an international article.

List of authors


The updated list of authors together with their affiliations can be downloaded here.

The Czech Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 3


A new issue of the Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:

F. Turnovec
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 227-230


Dimensions of Political Contestation: Voting in the Council of the European Union before the 2004 Enlargement
M. O. Hosli, M. C. J. Uriot
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 231-248

Coalitions in the EU Council: Pitfalls of Multidimensional Analysis
B. Plechanovova
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 249-266

Power and Responsibility in Environmental Policy Making
M. J. Holler, W. Wegner
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 267-288

Embedding Classical Indices in the FP Family
M. Chessa, V. Fragnelli
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 289-305

Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games
P. Dolezel
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 306-323

Voting Experiments: Measuring Vulnerability of Voting Procedures to Manipulation
J. Palguta
The Czech Economic Review 5 (3), 324-345

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